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connection and continuing policy relevance 
 
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to support the spirit of the early medieval prohibition 
of payment for the use of money, with arguments based on the economics of Keynes. At the 
heart of the usury doctrine is the idea that a creditor cannot expect both the security of a claim 
on a fixed sum of money and to derive an income from it; security comes at a price, one way 
or another. The consequences of the unwillingness of modern society to accept this are 
illustrated by reference to two problems of the modern international financial and monetary 
system: bank bailouts and the lack of a supranational reserve currency. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
At least since Bentham’s Defence of Usury (1787) and the abolition of the usury laws in 
England in 1854, the medieval Scholastic usury doctrine has been considered in the West to 
be obsolete, ‘buried long ago by both classical and modern economists’ (Cannan at al., 1932), 
with the exception of some authors in this journal (Dempsey, 1948; Divine, 1959; Clary, 
2011). Usury is now generally understood to refer only to exploitative lending and such 
debate as there is takes place only in relation to whether there should be a legal maximum 
rate (for example, the cap on payday lending charges introduced in the UK in 2015, partly 
due to the efforts of the Archbishop of Canterbury). Nevertheless the formal teaching of the 
Catholic Church has remained unchanged since its last exposition in the papal encyclical Vix 
Pervenit of Benedict XIV in 1745, which firmly reasserts the traditional prohibition of any 
payment for the use of money. The pastoral practice of the Church recognised the politics and 
practice of the Western secular world when in 1830 Pope Pius VIII advised the Bishop of 
Rennes that the faithful were not to be troubled further about this matter, pending any future 
statement by the Holy See – which has not so far been forthcoming! 
Although practical and political considerations played the major  role, political economy also 
played a significant part in legitimising the free market in money. The main thrust was that 
the usury doctrine was bad economics, as illustrated by the symposium in the Economic 
Journal (Cannan et al., 1932) prompted by Somerville (1931). The neoclassical economists 
argued that interest was the fruit of the union of productivity and thrift, a cost of production, 
neither rent nor economic profit. While Keynes supported Somerville against this 
proposition, he did not fully elaborate his ideas until The General Theory  (Keynes, 1936). 
If the Church’s doctrine is to be taken seriously, on grounds of reason rather than religion 
alone, the economic arguments have to be addressed. That indeed was the strategy of the 
previous authors in this journal. However Dempsey and Divine do not question the 
legitimacy of interest per se but are concerned with the creation of money by the banking 
system, which they judge to be inflationary and so inequitable.1 
The purpose of this paper is to support the spirit of the early medieval Scholastic position 
against any payment for the use of money, with arguments based on the economics of 
Keynes. This is not simply a matter of the history of economic thought. The interpretation 
                                                 
1 Dempsey’s own concept of ‘institutional usury’ depends upon the loanable funds fallacy (Hayes, 2010A). A 
full critique of Dempsey and Divine is matter for another paper. Clary (2011) argues that the payment of interest 
on central bank reserves rewards no genuine sacrifice on the part of member banks. 
presented here sheds new light on the concept of usury and on several aspects of modern 
economies, suggesting that the ancient teaching contains wisdom of continuing relevance to 
present problems. 
The relevance of Keynes is not simply in his brief compliments to Scholastic thought but in 
his overall theory of the nature of interest on money, as founded in our fear of the unknown 
future, manifested in the forms of liquidity preference and the state of confidence. This paper 
argues that Keynes’s thought is still not sufficiently well understood and that he provides the 
basis for a technical critique of the very institution of lending at interest, although he himself 
did not go quite so far, for good reasons of practical policy.  
Section 2 offers some preliminary clarification of the meaning of the usury doctrine in the 
Catholic tradition.2 A key point is the (mis)use of the concept of lucrum cessans to justify 
moderate interest. Section 3 summarises Keynes’s theory of interest and the connection 
between his concept of liquidity and his theory of probability. Interest is not a factor price 
based on productivity and thrift, bringing saving and investment into equilibrium, but an 
artificial rent for which there is no natural or moral justification, created by the propensity to 
hoard. Section 4 goes beyond Keynes to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical analysis 
with two examples, for the nature of banking in general and deposit insurance in particular, 
and for the reform of the international monetary system and of the IMF in particular. In both 
cases, modern society is unwilling to accept that the security offered by money comes at a 
price, one way or another. Section 5 concludes that the usury doctrine implies in a modern 
context that state deposit insurance should be limited to state-owned or ‘utility’ banks and 
that a reformed IMF should be empowered to issue a commodity-backed reserve currency. 
2. USURY AND INTEREST 
It is important to clarify precisely what is meant by the terms ‘usury’ and ‘interest’.  By usury 
Benedict XIV meant any payment for the use of money under a debt contract: not simply an 
excessive charge. The term ‘interest’ was reserved for the charges that might legitimately be 
claimed – the difference or id quod interest to reinstate the lender’s position – by way of cost 
or damages in making the loan, as opposed to a charge for use or rental. Such claims for 
damages attach, not to the loan of money per se, such as its amount and term, but to its effect 
on the particular lender. These claims were referred to as the extrinsic titles to interest and 
included charges for late payment (poena conventionalis) or consequential loss (damnum 
                                                 
2 For a brief wider survey including Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic literature, see Visser and Macintosh (1998).  
emergens). Originally, the claim could be made only after the event of loss and might have to 
be proven in court. Consistent with this, a third title (lucrum cessans, meaning compensation 
for loss of profits) was not accepted by Thomas Aquinas, or by other early Scholastics if the 
charge was fixed in advance (Divine, 1959; Jones, 1989; Munro, 2011). Clary (2011), 
following Dempsey (1948), adopts the more permissive reading of the later Jesuit Scholastics 
Molina, Lessius and de Lugo, which leads in turn to the modern distinction between 
legitimate interest and exploitative usury. 
Mills (1989) argues correctly that the acceptance of claims for lucrum cessans from the outset 
of a loan was the turning point that both undermined the usury doctrine and permitted the 
development of modern deposit banking.3 Lucrum cessans shifted from being compensation 
for actual consequential loss to the economists’ conception of opportunity cost. Originally a 
claim would be made for damages consequent upon default in repayment, e.g. through 
preventing a merchant from investing in new stock as planned, or being forced to sell stock at  
a loss to meet the cash shortfall. The lender would have to be engaged in some form of 
commercial enterprise; the loss of the opportunity simply to lend at interest to someone else 
is clearly a circular argument. The loss would be assessed in relation to the particular 
circumstances of the lender and the general rate of profit or interest was not directly relevant. 
No claim could be made for money that would otherwise have rested idle. 
In this paper, using the language of the economists rather than the Scholastics, ‘interest’ will 
be used to refer to any payment for the use or pure rental of money, rather than to a specific 
charge for costs or damages under the extrinsic titles. Indeed in modern debt contracts such 
additional charges are distinguished quite clearly from interest. Thus all lending at interest 
today represents usury as it was understood between the 5th and the 15th centuries. The 
relevance of the usury doctrine is not simply to a rent-charge at a rate in excess of a legal or 
moral standard of what constitutes a legitimate maximum. 
At the heart of the ancient dispute is the legitimacy of lending money for profit, not to be 
confused with the payment of compensation for any costs arising from an otherwise 
unremunerated loan or credit, nor with the investment of money in capital goods for profit. 
The usury doctrine does not prohibit investment in capital goods, directly or indirectly, for 
                                                 
3 Vix Pervenit stays out of the argument over lucrum cessans. It states clearly both that a pure rent-charge is 
illicit and also that there may be a legitimate basis for a payment under the extrinsic titles (‘not at all intrinsic to 
the loan contract’). An example of a legitimate payment in a modern context might be index-linking to protect 
purchasing power. The Pope left the discernment of the status of a particular payment to the theologians and 
canon lawyers. Later Vatican documents do not provide any further clarification. 
profit, provided that there is an acceptance of the risk of loss. In other words, financial 
investment should be a form of equity partnership.4 Such investment involves not only risk of 
loss but also a relationship involving some degree of ownership and control. 
The change in attitudes between the 15th and 17th centuries was mainly driven from the 
demand side, by the needs of commercial and state borrowers (for historical detail see 
Noonan, 1957; Munro, 2011). The emphasis of earlier teaching is on consumption loans and 
the exploitation of the poor by the rich. The changes permitting commercial banking and 
later, bankruptcy and limited liability, were pushed by wealthy business and financial 
interests, although they found a ready welcome among the growing rentier class.  Such 
borrowers usually prefer to take loans at interest, if they can get them, rather than accept 
profit-sharing partners or shareholders. This preference became still stronger with the 
introduction of corporate limited liability, mainly to protect the rentier (Ireland, 2010). The 
concentration of wealth and the discouragement of alternative forms of ownership of property 
and enterprise may be the most important modern consequences of lending at interest. This 
observation is in line with the insistence in Vix Pervenit that usury cannot be condoned, even 
on the grounds that the borrower is rich or uses the proceeds for productive purposes. 
The prohibition of interest would not mean the end of the market economy or even of 
finance. There are plenty of equity-based alternatives for the finance of business and indeed 
of housing and consumer durables, including various forms of credit co-operative. ‘Utility’ 
banking will always be needed to deal with the secure transmission of payments, the finance 
of the timing differences in production and distribution, and the exchange of currencies; 
bankers could still be rewarded for these services. It is likely that alternative forms of finance 
would impose higher private costs but section 4 will argue that they would also avoid the 
major externality costs of interest-based finance. 
At the heart of the usury doctrine is the idea that a creditor cannot expect both the security of 
a claim on a fixed sum of money and to derive an income from it; security comes at a price. 
Section 4 will provide two examples where modern society insists on having its cake and 
eating it: by insisting on a state guarantee for interest-bearing deposits with private banks 
and, in the other direction, by an unwillingness to accept the cost of establishing the secure 
reserve asset necessary to underpin the orderly international monetary system needed for 
global full employment.  
                                                 
4 This can take many forms, from simple partnership to incorporation as company or co-operative society. The 
extent of limited liability is a separate and complex issue. 
3. KEYNES ON INTEREST AND LIQUIDITY 
In The General Theory (Keynes, 1936, hereafter GT), Keynes draws a clear analytical 
distinction between money and capital, between interest on debts and the financial yield on 
physical capital assets.5 For Keynes, there is indeed a significant difference between ‘the loan 
of a horse and the loan of the purchase price of a horse’ (contra Marshall, 1920, p. 486).  
Interest is indeed the hire charge for parting with money for a specified period and provides 
the inducement to overcome liquidity preference, or more colourfully, the propensity to 
hoard. His analytical device for comparing the rate of interest with the financial return on 
physical assets is the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital. Keynes writes: 
I was brought up to believe that the attitude of the Medieval Church to the rate of interest was 
inherently absurd, and that the subtle discussions aimed at distinguishing the return on money-
loans from the return to active investment were merely jesuitical attempts to find a practical 
escape from a foolish theory. But I now read these discussions as an honest intellectual effort 
to keep separate what the classical theory has inextricably confused together, namely, the rate 
of interest and the marginal efficiency of capital. For it now seems clear that the disquisitions 
of the schoolmen were directed towards the elucidation of a formula which should allow the 
schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital to be high, whilst using rule and custom and the 
moral law to keep down the rate of interest. (GT, pp. 351–352) 
In The General Theory and in all post-Keynesian economic theory, the level of employment 
and income in a market economy is determined by effective demand, of which the primary 
motor is the level of gross investment. In Classical theory, the natural state of the economy is 
full employment and any unemployment is a matter of the deficiencies of workers or of 
imperfections in the labour market. In Keynesian theory, there is no natural tendency to full 
employment and unemployment is, in part at least, a symptom of failure at the level of the 
system as a whole. It is the possibility of such failure within Keynes’s theoretical framework, 
a possibility absent from the Classical theory, that leads Keynes to write: 
Provisions against usury are amongst the most ancient economic practices of which we have 
record. The destruction of the inducement to invest by an excessive liquidity-preference was 
the outstanding evil, the prime impediment to the growth of wealth, in the ancient and 
medieval worlds. And naturally so, since certain of the risks and hazards of economic life 
                                                 
5 Keynes had made this distinction in A Treatise on Money (Keynes, 1930), prompting Somerville (1931) to 
make the overt connection to usury doctrine, accepted with reservations by Keynes (Cannan et al.,1932). At that 
stage, Keynes had not fully articulated the concepts of effective demand and liquidity preference, as in The 
General Theory. 
diminish the marginal efficiency of capital whilst others serve to increase the preference for 
liquidity. In a world, therefore, which no one reckoned to be safe, it was almost inevitable that 
the rate of interest, unless it was curbed by every instrument at the disposal of society, would 
rise too high to permit of an adequate inducement to invest. (GT, p. 351) 
Keynes’s concern here is neither with charity nor with contractual justice (the direct concerns 
of the Scholastics)6 but with the consequences of liquidity preference for the general level of 
activity and prosperity. Although Keynes’s basic proposition about effective demand changed 
economic theory and policy for a period of some 40 years until the Classical ‘counter-
reformation’, his concept of liquidity preference was never really accepted nor, it must be 
said, fully understood. Nicholas Kaldor recognised at an early stage that by liquidity Keynes 
meant something more subtle than simple marketability or convertibility: 
Mr Keynes, in certain parts of The General Theory appears to use the term ‘liquidity’ in a 
sense which comes very close to our concept of ‘perfect marketability’; i.e. goods which can 
be sold at any time for the same price, or nearly the same price, at which they can be bought. 
Yet it is obvious that this attribute of goods is not the same thing as what Mr Keynes really 
wants to mean by ‘liquidity’. Certain gilt-edged securities can be bought on the Stock 
Exchange at a price which is only a small fraction higher than the price at which they can be 
sold; on this definition therefore they would have to be regarded as highly liquid assets. In fact 
it is very difficult to find satisfactory definition of what constitutes ‘liquidity’ – a difficulty, I 
think, which is inherent in the concept itself. (1939, p. 4, n5) 
Even a leading post-Keynesian defender of the concept of liquidity preference and of the 
authentic Keynes, Paul Davidson, defines liquidity in the following terms: 
In money-using, market-oriented entrepreneurial systems, liquidity is defined as being able to 
meet contractual obligations as they fall due. (2011, p. 18) 
By definition, liquid assets are assets that are traded on well-organized, orderly markets where 
the market maker assures the public that the next price will not be very different from the last 
transaction price, i.e. the price over time can change but it will move in an orderly manner. 
(2011, p. 119) 
                                                 
6 Keynes did not accept the Scholastics’ own arguments against the legitimacy of a payment for the use of 
money (Keynes, 1932). Although these arguments are worth reconsidering, space precludes doing so further in 
this paper. 
The principal difficulty with Davidson’s interpretation7 is that on this definition liquidity is 
not a property possessed mainly, if not exclusively, by money. Indeed to speak of the 
liquidity of money becomes tautological if liquidity is a matter of convertibility into money. 
Davidson does indeed refer to the stability of prices and to the settlement of contractual 
liabilities and this is important. Yet the paradox of The General Theory is that Keynes so 
emphasises the liquidity of money within a competitive theoretical framework in which all 
assets are equally marketable or convertible. This competitive assumption explains the 
absence of financial and industrial structure in The General Theory and the treatment of 
capital assets as though they were all individually traded on the stock exchange. 
Keynes makes the startling suggestion that in certain historic environments land has been the 
dominant liquid asset. Land can never have been preferred for its convertibility, let alone as 
the means of payment. Keynes claims that historically it has possessed high liquidity, despite 
its low convertibility. Conversely, in his discussion of organised investment markets, which 
come closest in practice to the ideal of perfect competition in terms of transaction costs and 
uniformity of price, he treats their ‘liquidity’ (note the inverted commas) as an illusion and 
something distinct from true liquidity. Listed equity securities have high convertibility, but 
low liquidity. 
So what is liquidity for Keynes and can it sustain the distinction between lending at interest 
and other forms of investment? This question cannot be answered without reference to his 
unique understanding of probability and expectation, which has its roots in his early work, A 
Treatise on Probability (Keynes, 1921). From the current perspective, Keynes’s work on 
probability is of particular interest as its underlying motivation was to provide a guide to 
ethical conduct independent of Christian faith and morals. 
At the heart of his analysis is a recognition of the nature of time as a one-way, irreversible 
sequence of historical events, and that decisions are always made in the present, based on the 
unchangeable past and the unknown future. In A Treatise  on Probability, Keynes treats 
Classical frequentist probability theory as a special case within a branch of philosophical 
logic that deals with arguments that are doubtful, but neither demonstrably certain nor 
logically impossible. He understands probability as an argument or logical relation between 
one set of propositions (the conclusions) and another set (the evidence). Mathematics deals 
                                                 
7 Davidson is by no means alone among the post-Keynesians. Both Kalecki (1971) and Minsky (1975) also 
rejected Keynes’s notion of liquidity, so that the view presented here is a minority (unique?) position among 
post-Keynesian economists. For a full exposition see Hayes (2006, 2012). 
with analytic relations between propositions that must be either true or false. In matters of 
metaphysics, science and conduct, an argument is considered ‘probable’ to the extent that it 
warrants a degree of rational belief. Such a probability relation is objective, in the sense that 
any rational judge would reach the same conclusion upon the same evidence. Probability is 
not in general numerical, as in frequentist theory, but arguments can be, and often are, 
compared. An archetypal case is the verdict reached in a court of law. 
The expected value of Classical probability theory is known (i.e. certain) as soon as the 
population frequency distribution is known, while an expectation in terms of Keynesian 
probability reflects the balance of available evidence yet remains uncertain. The confidence 
with which an expectation is held depends on the weight of the evidence compared with the 
conclusive evidence of hindsight (or hypothetical perfect foresight). Keynes illustrates this in 
his 1937 article: 
By uncertain knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known 
for certain from what is only probable.  The game of roulette is not subject in this sense to 
uncertainty…Or, again, the expectation of life is only slightly uncertain.  Even the weather is 
only moderately uncertain. The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the 
prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest 20 years 
hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth owners in the 
social system in 1970.  About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any 
calculable probability whatever.  We simply do not know.  (C.W. XIV: pp. 113–114) 
Classical economists have tended to regard this statement as either a counsel of despair or a 
mandate for behavioural economics, yet Keynes himself is more measured: 
We should not conclude that everything depends on waves of irrational psychology. On the 
contrary, the state of long-term expectation is often steady. Thus after giving full weight to the 
importance of the influence of short-period changes in the state of long-term expectation as 
distinct from changes in the rate of interest, we are still entitled to return to the latter as 
exercising, at any rate, in normal circumstances, a great, though not a decisive, influence on 
the rate of investment. (GT, p. 162) 
The prices of financial securities reflect not only what Keynes refers to as the ‘actuarial’ 
value, corresponding to the balance of evidence, but also the state of confidence, which is 
related to the weight of evidence. This distinction corresponds to ‘the difference between the 
best estimates we can make of probabilities and the confidence with which we make them’ 
(GT, p. 240). The celebrated ‘animal spirits’ or spontaneous optimism relate to the state of 
confidence and have their counter-poise in liquidity-preference, ‘the degree of our distrust of 
our own calculations and conventions concerning the future’ (C.W. XIV, p. 116). The state of 
confidence is not something separate from the state of long-term expectation, but part of it. 
Confidence is weak when we know that our expectations are likely to change substantially, 
but we have no precise idea as to their future state: our present expectations already represent 
the best we can do on the available evidence. By definition, a change in the state of 
expectation cannot be foreseen or even estimated. 
For Keynes then, liquidity is the degree to which the value of an asset is independent of 
changes in the state of expectation. Liquidity risk is the possible (not probable or expected) 
loss of value that such a change may impose; the risk reduces as the liquidity increases. 
Liquidity has value only because the future is unknown, and its value increases with our fear 
of what may happen that we cannot prevent or insure against. Liquidity-preference and 
animal spirits are opposite facets of the state of confidence, which is a matter of the weight of 
evidence behind our forecasts of the future. The propensity to hoard has its counterpart in the 
fear of goods (GT, p. 346), the reluctance to accept the hazards of physical investment. In a 
wider context this represents the failure of society to devise and promote local, national and 
global financial institutions capable of sustaining investment at the level consistent with full 
employment. 
4. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 
Although Keynes’s name is widely associated with public deficit spending, his main 
emphasis in The General Theory is on a policy of ‘cheap money’. Since liquidity preference 
is a matter of confidence, the rate of interest on long-term bonds can be managed down by 
astute policy. In The General Theory he emphasised the importance of the long rate for very 
long-term investments, such as buildings and public utilities. Furthermore, while he did think 
that ‘a somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment’ would be necessary to secure 
full employment, he clearly saw this as an exercise in institution-building which would 
combine private enterprise with the public interest (GT, p. 378). For Keynes, full employment 
requires new institutions to supplement, not necessarily supplant, market forces and 
overcome the tendency of the inducement to invest to fall short of the propensity to save. 
The best known example of Keynes’s emphasis on the need for new institutions was his plan 
for an International Clearing Union (Keynes, 1942), which failed to secure support from the 
US at Bretton Woods, in favour of Harry Dexter White’s International Monetary Fund. The 
General Theory is not, as commonly thought, a theory of a closed economy; consider 
Keynes’s use of his model in his extensive discussion of mercantilism. Nevertheless The 
General Theory itself did not draw out the importance of the balance of trade in allowing 
surplus countries to depress global income, something Keynes explicitly addressed in the 
Clearing Union proposal and its adjustment requirements in particular. 
How do the usury doctrine and Keynes’s concept of liquidity shed any light on these modern 
problems? Keynes in The General Theory was concerned with the rate of interest itself and 
looked forward to the ‘euthanasia of the rentier’, not by the legal prohibition of interest but 
by its reduction through monetary policy.  Events have shown that it is indeed within the 
power of central banks to follow a cheap money policy and through quantitative easing they 
have been pursuing this strenuously in recent years. The real returns on UK index-linked 
bonds are currently negative. It might be argued that Keynes’s cheap money policy has been 
achieved and so has eliminated interest without the need for a legal prohibition. 
While this may be true for government bonds, interest remains the foundation of the banking 
system. The losses suffered by taxpayers through explicit or implicit deposit insurance—not 
to mention the ever-increasing scale of bank crises since the end of Bretton Woods in 1971, 
let alone the Eurozone crisis—suggest something is badly wrong with the design of our 
financial system. The usury doctrine is telling us that the security offered by money should 
come at a price to the holder of money and not be used to exact a price from others. 
Furthermore Keynes’s theory of liquidity provides insight into the nature of this security, as 
stability of value in the face of changes in the state of expectation. His understanding of 
probability calls into fundamental question the methodology of securitization and financial 
liberalization; his concept of liquidity helps us define an asset capable of providing a 
genuinely secure anchor for the international monetary system. 
History shows that the cost of liquidity, or even of the craving for it, will be levied in an 
unjust and arbitrary fashion under an interest-based financial system, through under-
employment and tax-payer bailout. Liquidity, including security of the payments system, is a 
genuine need; the problem is its social cost. The next two sections consider two examples, in 
the national and international contexts respectively. 
4.1. A first example: deposit insurance as a step too far 
In the context of the finance of productive investment, the payment of interest can be seen as 
an information-saving device (Mills, 1989). The interest charge removes the obligation to 
account for profits and avoids the agency costs of ensuring the accountability of management 
to owners.  One consequence of the advances in information technology has been the advent 
of credit rating based purely on financial data, so that a credit score has become a substitute 
for a genuine relationship. In terms of usury doctrine, the payment of interest undermines the 
need and the incentive to create the more difficult human relationship involved in an equity 
partnership.  
The standard assumption of the corporate finance literature is that a ‘risky debt’ contract is 
optimal (Gale and Hellwig, 1985) under asymmetric information with limited liability. The 
fact that borrowers know more about their business than lenders leads to two pathologies, 
moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard means borrowers undertake higher risk 
projects with borrowed funds than they would with their own money, since the lender bears 
part of the cost of failure through limited liability. Adverse selection means that lenders are 
unable to discriminate between borrowers in terms of the riskiness of their projects. Both 
tendencies lead to credit rationing (and therefore a departure from the theoretical first-best 
optimum) but the literature argues that the second-best financial contract is a ‘risky debt’ 
contract incorporating a premium to compensate for the risk of default. 
Noonan records that such a risk premium was rejected by the early Scholastics as an extrinsic 
title to interest (1957, pp. 128–131). Bohren (1998) has observed that there is something 
deeply unsatisfactory about an economic theory that depends on breach of fiduciary duty to 
explain widespread phenomena, if only because such behaviour (to the extent that it is carried 
out in practice rather than merely assumed by theory) ultimately leads to market failure. From 
an ethical perspective, it is disturbing that interest-based finance positively encourages 
opportunistic behaviour—cheating—and the use of limited liability as a calculated strategy, 
rather than as a protection from unforeseeable events beyond the control of the borrower. 
The concept of risky debt is at the heart of the explosion of credit associated with 
securitization. The direct relationship between investor and user of the funds is eliminated by 
the move from ‘originate and hold’ to ‘originate and distribute’. The concept of the CDS 
(credit default swap) and the conversion of sub-prime lending into secure investment grade 
securities by the alchemy of the CDO (collateralised debt obligation) depends on the 
treatment of loans as simple transferable claims on future cashflow with well-behaved 
probability distributions of default. Beyond the Keynesian critique of confusing uncertainty 
with risk, the deeper issue for our purposes is that this system is only possible through 
lending at interest on a completely impersonal basis. From the perspective of the usury 
doctrine, the dishonesty of mortgage brokers and investment bankers merely compounded the 
intrinsic immorality of the underlying financial model. 
Ironically, the change in the banking model associated with risky debt was accompanied by 
the introduction in 1979 of deposit insurance in the UK and EU along the lines of the US 
model. Deposit insurance compounds the breach of the usury doctrine by increasing the 
security of interest-bearing deposits. Financial liberalization encouraged the development of 
universal banking, in which a single entity raised finance in many different forms other than 
traditional deposits, and undertook many different kinds of financial activity. This change 
corresponded to a shift in the regulatory regime from one of structural regulation, in which 
each type of financial institution specialised in a particular type of finance, to prudential 
regulation, under which financial institutions became free to pursue any type of activity 
provided they maintain the appropriate level of capital to protect creditors. Deposit insurance 
was introduced in Europe in the mistaken belief that prudential regulation made the banking 
system more secure and reduced risk. Government deliberately stood back from directing the 
allocation of capital and credit, leaving it to the wisdom or otherwise of the market. 
Underpinning prudential regulation and the securitized model are measures of capital 
adequacy based on the Classical model of probability. The model of structural regulation was 
based on a combination of relationships with customers, collateral against loss and lending 
decisions by experienced managers with specialised knowledge of their particular sector. 
These traditional banking methods do not make clever assumptions about probability 
distributions and are more robust in the face of Keynesian uncertainty. Structural regulation is 
a much more secure basis for deposit insurance, as it had been in the US since 1933 until the 
onset of deregulation, beginning with Savings and Loans institutions in the 1980s. 
The change in the banking and regulatory model and the introduction of deposit insurance in 
Europe led to substantial growth in the scale of financial institutions.  The line between retail 
and commercial banking on the one hand, and investment banking on the other, was blurred, 
then erased altogether. The growth in scale and consolidation of the financial sector meant 
that bank failures came to pose systemic risk to the monetary system. It became axiomatic 
that depositors must be protected and insured by the state, whether explicitly as in the case of 
retail deposits, or implicitly as in the case of Ireland and other Eurozone bailouts. When the 
crash came in 2008, a high proportion of the losses were passed to the state, with far-reaching 
consequences that we are still experiencing. 
A number of proposals have been made since 2008 to re-introduce a degree of structural 
regulation and to separate ‘utility’ from ‘casino’ banking. However the protection of 
depositors, with its implications for the capitalization of banks, has remained a central 
concern and the more radical proposals, involving formal separation and the break-up of  
banks ‘too big to fail’ have foundered. The UK Vickers Commission envisages the 
introduction of internal firewalls within the existing institutional structures. Past experience 
suggests these will not operate as a material constraint and that the banks will always outwit 
the regulators. Even a critical commentator such as Kane (2010) considers the reintroduction 
of Glass-Steagall provisions impractical. The tacit assumption shared by all commentators is 
that deposit insurance for all banks is essential. 
From the perspective of the usury doctrine, the global banking system continues to be 
founded upon two unethical premises, which have combined to create a lethal mixture: the 
centrality of the risk premium in the system of securitization and the guarantee of interest-
bearing deposits against risk. 
4.2. A second example: international money 
Keynes did not draw out explicitly the importance of trade surpluses as a form of excess 
saving until after The General Theory, in his proposals for an International Clearing Union 
(ICU) (Keynes, 1943). His underlying concern was with the tendency of an advanced 
economy to run financial surpluses, internal and external, representing lost output that is 
neither consumed nor invested in physical provision for the future. In The General Theory the 
primary focus was on internal surpluses and the need for a cheap money policy. In his later 
work, informed and driven partly by the imperatives of war finance and post-war 
reconstruction, Keynes recognised the need for mechanisms that would promote global full 
employment with balanced growth in international trade in goods and services. This would 
include the translation of any long-term trade surpluses into foreign lending to deficit 
countries, so as to ensure equilibrium in the balance of payments, taking both the current and 
capital accounts together. The mercantilist desire to accumulate foreign exchange reserves 
including gold— a policy entirely unavailable to the world as a whole—is the international 
equivalent of the domestic propensity to hoard (Carabelli and Cedrini, 2015). 
The economic case for a reform of the international monetary system along the lines of the 
ICU has been made by several authors over many years (e.g. Hart, Kaldor and Tinbergen, 
1964; Davidson, 2011). Post-Keynesian economists consider a managed system far superior 
in principle, in terms of full employment and global economic growth, to the system of 
flexible exchange rates and financial liberalization favoured by mainstream economists. Such 
a system would require as key elements: the creation of an international money as the reserve 
asset in substitution for the dollar and other currencies; balance of payments adjustment by 
surplus as well as deficit countries; and the reinstatement of capital controls. The political 
obstacles are clear, as shown by the outcome of the original Bretton Woods negotiations 
relative to Keynes’s original proposal. 
Of the many flaws in the final design of the International Monetary Fund, the most relevant is 
the nature of the reserve asset. Keynes had proposed the formation of a banking institution 
that could create credit in a unit of account (bancor) transferable only between central banks. 
In theory the need for international reserves can be met, not by holdings of foreign currencies 
or gold, but by an overdraft facility, creating reserves ex nihilo. However this would mean 
that the credit balances in the system at any time represented claims, not on gold or 
convertible currencies, but on member states. This was unacceptable to the US as the major 
creditor in 1944, so that the institution which emerged was not a bank but a fund, created by 
the subscription of existing national currencies and gold. 
The liquidity preference of sovereign states manifests itself in the desire for a reserve asset, 
like gold, whose value is considered stable in the face of fundamental uncertainty and does 
not depend on the economic or foreign policies of any individual state. Once again, the issue 
here is not simply convertibility, since no-one doubts that US dollars or sterling can be 
exchanged for goods. Since 1971, when the US dollar became no longer convertible to gold, 
the world has by default been on a dollar standard, sustained only by the relative size and 
strength of the US economy and its financial markets, not to mention its political and military 
power, and the use of the dollar as the unit of account in most international trade. It is no 
accident that this dominance has coincided with a period of financial liberalization and 
flexible exchange rates, which have favoured the dollar’s use as a key or vehicle currency in 
foreign exchange trading and its continuing reserve status, faut de mieux. 
The Euro was created partly in response to the post-1971 turbulence in exchange rates but no 
account was taken of the implications of monetary union for the balance of trade between 
member states. It would have been better to have re-created a version of the European 
Payments Union (Amato and Fantacci, 2012), with an additional provision for an automatic, 
compulsory, adjustment of national currencies against the clearing currency, in line with 
domestic costs and to address structural disequilibrium. This would also have made explicit 
the need for private capital inflows to be justified in terms of their positive contribution to net 
exports over the term of the investment, as Greece, Spain and Italy have been harshly 
reminded.  
However the precedents offered by the EPU and the ICU rely on an acceptance of sovereign 
risk. In the context of the EPU and the Eurosystem this acceptance is feasible because 
secession from the European Union in order to repudiate foreign debt is (almost) unthinkable, 
as the experience of Greece so far has shown. The Eurosystem appears to be surviving for 
political reasons, despite the weakening of democracy and the economic costs involved in 
reversing current account deficits in order to repay foreign debt, now embodied in the 
TARGET2 balances between central banks and the ECB. However this mutual commitment 
does not exist for the world as a whole. If the much-needed reform of the international 
monetary system is to take place prior to any global pooling of sovereignty, the need for a 
reserve asset independent of national sovereignty will have to be addressed (Hayes, 2013). 
It is not beyond the wit of man to design the secure reserve asset needed to anchor the 
international monetary system and provide a firm reference value for a system of adjustable 
exchange rates. In 1964 Nicholas Kaldor, supported by Hart and Tinbergen and following the 
earlier work by Keynes, Hayek and the two Grahams, drew up and presented to UNCTAD a 
blueprint for an international commodity reserve currency (Hart, Kaldor and Tinbergen, 
1964). This represented a refinement of Keynes’s earlier ICU proposals and proposed that the 
IMF issue bancor in exchange for a basket of the 30 major commodities that dominate 
international trade. Bancor would thereby constitute a stable and universal standard of value 
in real terms – in Keynes’s terms, the ultimate source of liquidity. 
While some fiduciary element (i.e. loans to central banks denominated in bancor) would be 
desirable, the commodity basket substitutes, like gold, for the ability to impose taxation 
which ultimately supports national fiat currencies. Crucially, security against political risk 
can be provided by distributing the physical warehousing of the commodities approximately 
in line with major holdings of bancor. Such a scheme comes at a price, rather than generating 
an income. Yet the present system imposes economic costs through underemployment, 
inflation or default, invariably on the poorer members of global society who are less able to 
protect themselves. A more just and rational international monetary system would recognise 
these social costs explicitly and distribute them equitably. 
5. IN CONCLUSION 
The ancient prohibition of payment for the use of money embodies wisdom which remains 
relevant today. Its central idea is that a creditor cannot expect both security and income, 
while a debtor should not presume to offer them. The doctrine fell into abeyance in the West 
after the 17th century as society changed, at least partly because the new commercial classes 
preferred to borrow at interest rather than take in formal equity partners. Once personal 
bankruptcy and corporate limited liability were accepted in the 19th century, it became 
possible to create a whole financial system based on ‘risky debt’; the payment of interest as 
compensation for risk had been explicitly rejected in the 15th century. The economists of the 
21st century have done great harm by their encouragement of securitization. The elimination 
of any human relationship between borrower and lender and the introduction of state 
insurance for private bank deposits has made it impossible to justify banking as even an 
imperfect form of risk-sharing partnership.  
Keynes was among the few economists to recognise the importance of the distinction 
between money and capital. His analysis was based on a concept of liquidity which has been 
neglected or misunderstood from the outset, as something considerably more than 
convertibility. For Keynes, the peculiar role of money is grounded in the nature of time and 
our fundamental uncertainty about the future. Our fear of the unknown prompts a craving for 
security, a propensity to hoard rather than to invest in physical productive assets. This 
liquidity preference imposes a social cost in terms of underemployment yet the lender can 
command a premium for forgoing liquidity, in the absence of an ethical and legal prohibition.  
Keynes argued that the power of interest-bearing debt needed to be countered by a policy of 
cheap money and by the creation of financial institutions oriented towards long-term equity 
investment and the promotion of full employment. 
Undoubtedly there is a legitimate need for a secure store of value and means of payment. The 
usury doctrine implies that the security offered by money, i.e. liquidity in Keynes’s terms,  
comes at a price and this cost should be borne by the holder of money and not externalised. 
We have applied this principle to two very different policy areas, the insurance of deposits 
and the nature of foreign exchange reserves. In the first case, deposit insurance should be 
restricted to ‘utility’ banks that provide essential payment services and collateral-based 
finance. Their depositors would be unlikely to receive interest and rather would pay charges 
for safe custody. Depositors in uninsured institutions would have to recognise and accept 
their risk, which would encourage the development of more democratic financial institutions 
(Hayes, 2010B). In the case of foreign exchange reserves, a condition of the reform of the 
international monetary system towards the promotion of full employment is the independence 
of the value of the global reserve asset from the economic and foreign policies of sovereign 
states. This requirement could be met by a variant of one of the well-known commodity-
reserve schemes, which offer, indeed, security at a price. 
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